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1 - C. B. Post  
1 - Mr. Rosen  
1 - Mr. Belmont

July 29, 1958

Director, FBI

66-150

There is enclosed for your attention and interest  
Copy No. 2 of the monograph, "Mafia," comprising two sections.

Section I is a study of the origin, nature, and activities  
of the Mafia in its native Italy. This Section serves as a  
background for an understanding of the Mafia in the United States.


Section II explains the transplantation of the Mafia to this  
country, sets forth its past and present activities in this country,  
and describes the form through which it persists.

It is requested that information in this monograph be held  
in confidence by you and personnel of your office and that this Bureau  
be completely protected as the source of the information.

Enclosures (2)

NOTE:

Based on memo W. C. Sullivan to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated  
July 9, 1958, captioned "Mafia, Central Research Matter," CBP:aml/lmm.



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50 AUG 12 1958

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JUL 29 10 36 AM '58

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 9, 1958

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: MAFIA  
CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Approval requested for captioned monograph to be disseminated all field offices, Legal Attaches, the Attorney General, and Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Department, in view of his interest in and cooperation in furnishing valuable information concerning the Mafia.

This monograph, prepared by the Central Research Section, is in two sections. The first section is a study of the origin, nature, and activities of the Mafia its native Sicily as a background to the Mafia in the United States. The second section explains how it was transplanted to the United States, sets forth its past and present activities in this country, and describes the form through which it continues.

Special security precautions are being taken in connection with this monograph. The copies of the monograph will be numbered to insure full control of it. Each SAC will be advised that he is wholly responsible for the security of this monograph; that he must be responsible for the charging out of copies of the monograph to Agents and for the return of these copies from the Agents when they have been studied.

In the SAC Letter announcing the transmittal of this monograph to the field offices, SACs are being cautioned that (1) none of the information contained in the two sections of the monograph is to be disclosed to or discussed with anyone who is not an employee of the FBI, and (2) complete secrecy is to be given to the monograph itself. It is being pointed out that these measures are made necessary due to the publicity being given the Mafia at this time.

The copies of the monograph designated for the Attorney General and the Bureau of Narcotics will be transmitted by cover memorandum in which the recipients will be clearly and fully cautioned not to disclose the information in the two sections of the monograph to any person other than the personnel of their own offices. Both recipients will also be cautioned that our Bureau as the source of this information must be completely protected at all times.

Enclosures

EP:aml/lmm

(6)

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Kurtzman (Room 7616)

Section tickler

J. M. Sizoo

REC 73 100-42303-330

JUL 31 1958

CENTRAL RESEARCH



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5 Memorandum to Mr. Belmont  
6 Re: MAFIA  
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8 CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER  
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12 Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia offices  
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14 lowest number (1) will go to each Legal Attache.  
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27 Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Department.  
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MAFIA

Section II

United States

July, 1958

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700-42303-330

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PREFACE

This second section is concerned with the Mafia in the United States. Because of the esoteric nature of the Mafia and because of certain modifications which have appeared in this country, an explanatory statement relative to two basic terms used, Mafia and Mafiosi, \* is necessary.

The term Mafia as used here includes the transplanting to American soil from Sicily, Italy, the shared criminal traditions, customs, and methods of a particular class of lawless Sicilians. It includes the continuance of essential blood ties, cultural similarities, intermarriages, racial cohesiveness and operational clannishness. All this takes on certain organizational forms ending in organized criminality. The result is the formation of a special criminal clique or caste composed primarily of individuals of Sicilian origin or descent who comprise a distinct but related segment of the whole of organized crime; a segment which takes on the characteristics of a lawless brotherhood.

The term Mafiosi as used here means individual adherents to the Mafia as defined above. These are the persons organized in the form of a collection of gangs and groups throughout the country bound together loosely in a federationlike pattern, which makes up the Mafia. Each gang or group of Mafiosi usually operates autonomously in its own territory.

\*The singular is Mafioso.

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9 and has a specified sphere of jurisdiction and activity. Further, the  
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11  
12 Mafiosi have in common with each other these very important  
13  
14 characteristics:

- 15 1. Cooperation for mutual benefit
- 16 2. Secrecy and silence
- 17 3. Close family ties
- 18 4. Racial exclusiveness
- 19 5. Intense hatred and disrespect for law and law
- 20 enforcement officers
- 21 6. Deliberate efforts to corrupt law enforcement
- 22 officers proceeding from the conviction that these
- 23 officers of their very nature are corruptible
- 24 7. The systematic use of intimidation and vengeance
- 25 as a matter of policy
- 26 8. Conscienceless recourse to murder as a means to
- 27 an end.

28  
29 In this section of the monograph, a number of individuals are  
30 referred to as Mafiosi. They have been so designated by sources and  
31 informants utilized in this study. In addition to this, the individuals  
32 designated as Mafiosi in this section are those who have consistently  
33 manifested a majority of the characteristics outlined above and who come  
34 within the definition of Mafiosi given.

35  
36 To sum up: the Mafia in the United States as it now exists is  
37 the sum total of, or the collectivity of the organized criminality of its  
38 adherents, the Mafiosi.



## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### A. Summary

The roundup of 61 Sicilian-Italian hoodlums at Apalachin, New York, on November 14, 1957, once again focused the public spotlight on the Mafia in the United States. For years, there have been speculations as to the existence and nonexistence of such an organization in this country. Available evidence shows that beyond the shadow of a doubt, the Mafia does exist today in the United States, as well as in Sicily and Italy, as a vicious, evil, and tyrannical form of organized criminality.

The Mafia is a special criminal clique or caste composed primarily of individuals of Sicilian origin or descent within organized crime. There is an affinity among Mafiosi (Mafia adherents) for associating and cooperating in criminal activities. This affinity is the result of shared criminal traditions, cultural similarities, provincial clannishness, blood ties, and intermarriages.

It would be absurd to think that the American counterpart of the traditional Mafia of Italy is a distinctly outlined, conventional type of organization. It would be equally absurd to think that because it is not, it has no existence at all. The Mafia is organized criminality having the characteristics of a lawless brotherhood which functions as a part of organized crime.

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9 The Mafia does not possess the attributes of an orthodox organi-

10 zation and does not function in a formal, legal manner. It has no member-  
11 ship rolls but has adherents. There are recognized leaders who achieve  
12 their status by their dedication to the criminal order, their ruthlessness,  
13 and their accumulated wealth. These leaders define the criminal objectives,  
14 give the orders, and provide the means for reaching the objectives.  
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22 The Mafia is not a centrally organized group, but is rather a  
23 collection of gangs and groups throughout the country loosely bound together  
24 in a federationlike pattern. Each Mafia-led gang or group is usually  
25 autonomous in its own territory and has its distinct spheres of jurisdiction  
26 and activity.  
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33 The Mafia in the United States does not appear to be controlled  
34 from abroad. There are, however, close connections and associations  
35 between Mafiosi in Italy and Mafiosi in this country, in which the deported  
36 hoodlum, Charles "Lucky" Luciano, plays an important role.  
37  
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42 The Mafia manifests a perennial pattern of criminal characteristics  
43 which include: (1) association of Sicilian-Italian criminal elements;  
44 (2) cooperation for mutual protection, assistance, growth, and gain;  
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7 (3) adherence to omerta, the Mafia code of conspiratorial secrecy and silence;  
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9  
10 (4) hatred and disrespect for the law and its enforcers; (5) corruption of  
11  
12 politicians, public officials, and law enforcement officers; and (6) use of  
13  
14 intimidation, vengeance, and murder to achieve its criminal objectives.  
15

16 The Mafia spread to the United States with the immigration of  
17  
18 Sicilians and Italians in the late 19th Century and in the early decades of the  
19  
20 present century. Early Mafia activity was evident in 1890 when the chief of  
21  
22 police of New Orleans was murdered by Mafia criminal elements.  
23

24  
25 Mafiosi were active in the so-called Black Hand crimes of  
26  
27 extortion, blackmail, violence, and murder among residents of Sicilian and  
28  
29 Italian communities in American cities from coast to coast until 1920, after  
30  
31 which Black Hand depredations died out.  
32

33  
34 Prohibition brought Mafiosi together in gangs which engaged in  
35  
36 extensive and lucrative bootlegging activities. Toward the end of Prohibition,  
37  
38 Mafiosi began cooperating and collaborating with criminals and criminal  
39  
40 groups of other nationality backgrounds. Great wealth was acquired and  
41  
42 tremendous influence was exerted by Mafiosi during Prohibition.  
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46 With the repeal of Prohibition, Mafiosi turned to other sources of  
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48 illicit revenue, principally gambling, narcotics traffic, and industrial and  
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50 labor racketeering.  
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8 Today, the Italian lottery in New York City, the numbers racket in  
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10 Detroit, and the gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Havana, Cuba,  
11  
12 are Mafia targets. Mafiosi are engaged in the trafficking of drugs on a  
13  
14 national and international scale. Mafia racketeers are busy in bootlegging,  
15  
16 loan sharking, garbage and trash cartage, and labor unions, as well as in  
17  
18 "shakedown" activities involving laundries and prostitution.

19  
20 A substantial portion of the huge income Mafiosi derive from their  
21  
22 criminal operations has been invested in legitimate business ventures, both  
23  
24 as a front for their criminal activities and as a means of profitable investment.  
25  
26 Mafiosi are engaged in a wide variety of legal enterprises, including liquor  
27  
28 distributorships, race tracks, banking and financing firms, slot- and coin-  
29  
30 machine companies, and garment-manufacturing concerns.

31  
32 In order to plan, direct, and coordinate their criminal operations,  
33  
34 top Mafia leaders from all parts of the country have met from time to time  
35  
36 over a period of years. The first important conference of Sicilian-Italian  
37  
38 hoodlums took place in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1928, and a number of similarly  
39  
40 significant gatherings have been convened in succeeding years. The largest  
41  
42 meeting of Mafiosi known to date occurred in Apalachin, New York, in  
43  
44 November, 1957. At least 81 leading Sicilian-Italian criminals were in  
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46 attendance at this particular meeting.



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Possible reasons for the Apalachin meeting include: (1) reviewing the problem of racket control formerly exercised by Albert Anastasia, who was shot to death in New York City in October, 1957; (2) settling the cash transactions of various operations involving individuals present; (3) discussing the illegal manufacture and distribution of alcohol; (4) devising means of countering unfavorable publicity arising from the trade-union racketeering activities of some hoodlums; (5) planning to gain control of the ladies garment industry; (6) discussing the illicit narcotics traffic; (7) examining the gambling interests of those present; and (8) projecting new enterprises, legal and illegal.

B. Conclusions

1. The Mafia represents one of the most ruthless, pernicious, and enduring forms of criminality ever to exist in the United States.
2. The viciousness and effectiveness of the Mafia stem from its conspiratorial grouping of Sicilian-Italian hoodlums, its adherence to a code of secrecy and silence, and its use of intimidation, violence, vengeance, and murder.
3. The fact that Mafia adherents are primarily Sicilian or Italian by birth or descent does not mean that all, a majority, or even a substantial number, of Sicilians or Italians are criminals or Mafiosi.
4. Mafiosi do not participate in such strictly predatory crimes as robberies, burglaries, or larcenies, but concentrate on such immensely profitable and less hazardous big-time criminal ventures as gambling, illicit narcotics traffic, labor and industrial racketeering, and bootlegging.

5. Mafiosi are continually searching for new and lucrative fields of criminal and legitimate endeavor to increase their wealth, power, and influence.
6. Many victims of, or witnesses to, criminal acts committed by Mafiosi are reluctant, through their dread of familiar Mafia methods, to make complaints or statements to law enforcement officers or to testify in court.
7. By means of bribery, Mafiosi have attempted--successfully on occasions--to corrupt officials of local, state, and Federal governments, including representatives of law enforcement agencies, to advance their criminal ends.
8. The legal and illegal activities of Mafiosi are so intertwined that distinguishing between the two is frequently difficult, especially as to their sources of income.
9. Mafia leaders carefully remove themselves from actual association with lower criminal elements and avoid participation in ordinary criminal activity. This practice, in addition to their great wealth, power, and influence, gives them an amazing immunity from arrest and prosecution.
10. In order to combat the menace presented by the Mafia, it is necessary to understand the underlying criminal code of the Mafia, its modus operandi, the implications and ramifications of its operations, and its relationship to organized crime.
11. Since it is impossible to proceed against the Mafia as a legal entity, investigations by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies must be intensified and must be pursued vigorously and relentlessly to secure the successful prosecution of individual Mafiosi for any and all violations of the law.



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## **I. EXISTENCE OF MAFIA**

### **A. Speculations on Existence and Nonexistence**

The Mafia in the United States has been the subject of much speculation and discussion by many writers and self-styled authorities in recent years. Allegations of its existence and nonexistence run the gamut from one extreme to the other.

Some contend that all organized crime in the United States is controlled by the Mafia, and that the Mafia, as an organization, functions on an international scale with Charles "Lucky" Luciano, a notorious hoodlum who was deported (1) from this country in 1946, directing its affairs from Italy.

On the other hand, there are those who insist that there is no indication that the Mafia controls or directs crime in this country, or that it is even primarily responsible for the vast volume of organized criminal activity either in the United States or abroad. (62-98679; 100-42303-242)

Others hold that the Mafia was an old-time organization of Italians who were involved in Black Hand extortion and violence prior to Prohibition. Proponents of this theory maintain that the Mafia went out of existence with repeal, its adherents entering other organized criminal groups called

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9 "syndicates," "combines," or "combinations." Still others say that the

10  
11 Mafia never did exist.<sup>(2)</sup>

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13 Many people are unable to comprehend the Mafia, since it does  
14  
15 not possess the attributes of an open or a formally organized society or  
16  
17 group with clearly defined leaders, members, records, and activities.

18  
19 Hence, it is easy to rationalize and conclude that there is no formal organ-  
20  
21 ization called the Mafia.  
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23  
24 The truth of the matter is, the available evidence makes it  
25  
26 impossible to deny logically the existence of a criminal organism known as  
27  
28 the Mafia, which for generations has plagued the law-abiding citizens of  
29  
30 Sicily, Italy, and the United States.  
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34 As we shall see, the Mafia does exist in the United States today  
35  
36 as a special criminal clique or caste that is composed primarily--if not  
37  
38 wholly--of individuals of Sicilian-Italian origin or descent. These individuals  
39  
40 have demonstrated a willingness--even a preference--for association and  
41  
42 for mutual cooperation in criminal enterprises as a result of a shared  
43  
44 criminal tradition, cultural similarities, provincial clannishness, blood ties,  
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46 and intermarriages. In this sense, it is the American counterpart of the  
47  
48 old Sicilian-Italian Mafia. It exists not as a distinctly outlined, conventional  
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8 organization, but as a criminal movement and a mode or way of life, no less  
9 harmful to the United States. (62-9-72, pp. 2, 3; 100-42303-302, pp. 243)

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12 B. Indications of Existence

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14 1. Kefauver Committee

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17 The Kefauver Committee,\* in a report on its nationwide hearings in  
18 1950-1951, concluded that there is a "sinister criminal organization known as  
19 the Mafia operating throughout the country with ties in other nations." The  
20 Committee described the Mafia as a "loose-knit organization specializing in  
21 the sale and distribution of narcotics, the conduct of various gambling enterprises,  
22 prostitution, and other rackets based on extortion and violence."  
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31 Despite the traditional refusal of Mafiosi to testify regarding the (3)  
32 Mafia, and the difficulty the Committee had in obtaining data on secret operations  
33 of the Mafia, the hearings revealed that the Mafia "is no fairy tale." According  
34 to Senator Estes Kefauver, the Committee found ample indications that the  
35 Mafia is a "shadowy international organization that lurks behind much of  
36 America's criminal activity." (4) (5)  
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45 2. Federal Bureau of Narcotics

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47 Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics  
48 of the Treasury Department, testifying at a hearing of the Kefauver Committee in  
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53 \*United States Senate Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in  
54 Interstate Commerce.  
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10 1950, declared that the Mafia is the power behind the huge criminal  
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12 syndicate which deals on a nationwide basis in illegal narcotics traffic,  
13 (7)  
14 gambling, murder, white slavery, counterfeiting, and other crimes.  
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17 In his testimony in 1953 before the Subcommittee of the  
18  
19 House Committee on Appropriations, Anslinger further explained that  
20  
21 the Mafia is not an organization that you can "put your finger on" in  
22  
23 that it does not have a central governing body and other features of a  
24  
25 formal group. He stated, however, that the Mafiosi in one area of  
26  
27 the country know and work with those in other areas, and that the Mafia  
28  
29 (8)  
30 is international in scope.  
31  
32

33 Other officials of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics have also  
34  
35 pointed out that the Mafia operates in the United States as a group of  
36  
37 Italians--primarily Sicilians--dedicated to crime and mutual assistance.  
38  
39 They say that the Mafia has been difficult to penetrate and study because  
40  
41 (9)  
42 of the traditional secrecy and silence practiced by Mafiosi. (62-75147-47-56, pp. 2  
43 23; 62-9-31-144, pp. 141-143; 62-75147-15-60, p. 2; 62-75147-37-81, pp. 7, 8)  
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### 3. FBI Sources

Many FBI sources agree that there is a Mafia in existence in the United States at the present time. They feel that it exercises a very real power and influence in the perpetration of much of the crime in this country. They say that it is an importation from Sicily and Italy, having been brought here by Sicilian immigrants, some of them being Mafiosi who were fugitives from justice. (100-42303-244; 62-75147-15-82, pp. 99-101) b7D

One source, who said his father and uncle were Mafiosi, regards the Mafia as a secret society, consisting exclusively of Sicilians, which is found in various countries around the world where Sicilians have settled. According to this informant, it is not controlled on an international scale but there are intimate ties between the Mafia in Sicily and the Mafia in the United States. Much of the power and wealth possessed by the Mafia in this country, he stated, originated during the Prohibition era. (100-42303-282) b7D

A second informant has stated that the Mafia functions in this country with separate groups in various cities directing their own activities. He said that leaders and members in different parts of the country are related by blood or marriage in many cases. He termed the Mafia in his city a loosely knit, informal organization, and said that the Mafiosi look upon the



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7 Mafia as a type of fraternal, mutual benefit society which can assist them  
8  
9 in their legal or illegal activities. (100-42303-280, pp. 11-15)  
10 [REDACTED] b7D

11 A third Informant has said that Mafia leaders in various localities  
12  
13 serve as leaders of criminal syndicates in which other nationality or racial  
14  
15 groups may participate. In his particular area, he explained, Mafia  
16  
17 dominance resulted from an agreement between rival Sicilian groups which  
18  
19 had preyed upon Italian immigrants who had been successful in this country  
20  
21 in legitimate business. (100-42303-280, pp. 1, 2)  
22 [REDACTED] b7D

23 It is the belief of another Informant that there is a Mafia now  
24  
25 operating in the United States. He emphasized that the Mafiosi have changed  
26  
27 their methods and are now conducting as much business as possible through  
28  
29 orthodox business channels rather than resorting only to their old techniques  
30  
31 of direct force and violence. According to this source, Mafia front men,  
32  
33 who have accumulated considerable wealth and influence, pose as respectable  
34  
35 citizens having no apparent connections with the Mafia. (100-42303-83)  
36 [REDACTED] b7D

37 Another informant has reported that the Mafia originated in this  
38  
39 country as an outgrowth of Italian immigration. Many of the newly arrived  
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41 Italian immigrants, he said, were governed in the areas in which they lived  
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43 by "block bosses," or curypars, and their business activities had to be  
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8 approved by these cumpars, who, in turn, were responsible to the Mafia  
9 hierarchy. (100-42303-274) [REDACTED] 67D

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11  
12 Another source has described the Mafia as a way of lawless  
13 life--rather than an open, formal organization--in which an individual must  
14 abide by certain rules of conduct laid down by the area head of the Mafia.  
15 The Mafiosi are extremely vindictive and have absolutely no respect for law  
16 and order, according to this informant. (62-9-26-37, p. 24)

17  
18 All the FBI sources mentioned are aware of the existence of a large  
19 segment of the underworld in the United States composed of Sicilian-Italian  
20 hoodlums. These hoodlums constitute a criminality based on common national  
21 origins, friendships, family relationships, close-knit leadership, and long-  
22 established methods of terror and violence. Other nationality and racial  
23 groups operate in the underworld but, except in extremely rare instances, they  
24 do not have access to the controlling circle of the Mafia. [REDACTED] 67D  
25 62-9-34-  
26 133; 62-9-34-144, pp. 178-179)

27  
28 -C. Characteristics of Mafia

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30 1. General

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32 The Mafia in the United States has naturally manifested criminal  
33 characteristics which are similar or akin to those of the Mafia in Sicily and  
34 Italy. But it has also introduced some innovations in criminal activities in the  
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7 United States which are strictly the product of local social, economic, and  
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9 political phenomena unlike those which prevailed in Sicily and Italy. While  
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11 the characteristics to be set forth are typically, traditionally, and historically  
12  
13 Mafia, not all of them need be present in any single operation to identify it as  
14  
15 Mafia operation.  
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## 18 2. Association of Sicilian Criminal Elements


19  
20 The Mafia consists of criminals of Sicilian background who are  
21  
22 associated by reason of criminal activities, family ties, intermarriage,  
23  
24 provincial clannishness, and cultural similarities. The Mafiosi are individuals  
25  
26 with a proclivity for criminal action, preferring to make their livelihood from  
27  
28 crime rather than from legitimate means.  
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31  
32 Sicilian and Italian immigrants have always been disposed to establish  
33  
34 and settle in their own colonies in this country. The fact that they have a common  
35  
36 national origin has tended to draw them close to one another and to reduce  
37  
38 their desires or opportunities to grow out of the circle of the Italian commu-  
39  
40 nity. The additional barrier of language and frequent illiteracy has also  
41  
42 minimized their chances for making friends and associating outside their own  
43  
44 native group. Moreover, succeeding generations of Sicilians and Italians  
45  
46 have often been subjected to the continuing pressure of parents and first-  
47  
48 generation Americans to remain aloof from other nationality or racial groups. (10)  
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(100-42303-302)



# BIOGRAPHY OF A MAFIOS



# **RUSSELL ALFRED BUFALINO**

- ① 1903 - Born Montedoro, Sicily.  
Brought by family to Pittston, Pennsylvania.
- ② 1904 - Father died; Mafioso uncle was guardian during youth in Pittston.
- ③ 1917 - Moved to Buffalo, N. Y. Claimed birth in Sicily until late 1920's.  
Arrested in Buffalo 1920's and 1930's on several charges, including defacing automobile numbers, possession of stolen car; no convictions.  
Worked for automobile agency of John Charles Montana\* in Buffalo.
- ④ 1938 - Returned to Pittston. Was mechanic in coal company of Mafia leader Santo Volpe until 1942. Cousin recorded his birth as American in court records.
- ⑤ 1942-1946 -  
Chauffeur and service man for soft-drink plant of Joseph Barbara, Sr.\*, Binghamton, N. Y.
- ⑥ 1946 - Returned to Pittston. About 1947 assumed Mafia leadership after death of John Scianadra. Described as power in garment factories in area. Associates Angelo Scianadra\*, Nick Abrice\*, James Osticco\*.
- ⑦ 1953 - Visited New York City frequently. Used contacts in garment industry to obtain contracts for Pittston area firms. Allegedly attended fights in New York City with Johnny Dio, convicted labor racketeer.
- ⑧ 1954 - Ran dice games and bookmaking operations.  
Drove automobile of Joseph Barbara, Sr., in Pittston area.
- ⑨ 1956 - Pallbearer at Detroit funeral of sister of Angelo Polizzi, now deceased Detroit Mafia leader.  
Visited Havana, Cuba, and gambling casino with James Osticco\* on vacation trip.
- ⑩ 1957 - Received telephone calls from Emanuel Zicari\*, associate of Barbara, Sr. Attempted to fly to Detroit 9/57, at time of funeral of Angelo Polizzi, Mafia leader.  
Flew in private plane with James Osticco and others to visit Barbara, Sr., 10/29/57 at Apalachin, N. Y.  
Reserved and paid for hotel rooms for Apalachin visitors Joseph F. Civello\*, Frank Desimone\*, Simone Scozzari\* at Scranton, Pa., night before Apalachin meeting.  
Traveled with Civello, Desimone, Scozzari, to Barbara, Sr.'s, Apalachin home 11/14/57.  
Stopped by New York State Police leaving meeting in car with Mafiosi Gerardo Cateno\*, Vito Genovese\*, Joseph Ida\*, Dominic Oliveto\*.
- ⑪ 1958 - Questioned by New York City Police re Albert Anastasia killing 10/57. Admitted knowing Anastasia, but denied knowledge of murder.  
Prior to deportation hearing, Bufalino's lawyer, son-in-law of former Mafia leader, called Palermo, Sicily, re existence of Bufalino's birth record there. Lawyer informed American had found Sicilian birth record.  
Ordered deported for falsely claiming birth in U. S., on 4/2/58.

\*Attended Apalachin meeting 1957

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9 One of the most important factors which have bound together the  
10  
11 Mafiosi in this country in their legal and illegal activities is family ties. The  
12  
13 closeness and cooperation of families, involving fathers, sons, brothers,  
14  
15 uncles, cousins, nephews, fathers-in-law, and brothers-in-law, among  
16  
17 Sicilian-Italian criminals are a distinguishing feature of Mafia operations.  
18  
19 Mafia families are reminiscent of some of the notorious non-Italian criminal  
20  
21 family gangs of the 1930's, notably "Ma" Barker and her sons.  
22  
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24 Strong family affiliations have tended to solidify the lawless tradition.  
25  
26 of the Mafia. Mafiosi families reserve for themselves, rather than the police,  
27  
28 the right to revenge the injury to or death of a member of the family. Whenever  
29  
30 a member of a family is threatened with harm, other members are more than  
31  
32 ready and willing to protect him. An offense against one is regarded as an  
33  
34 offense against all, which must be avenged at all costs. (11)  
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37  
38 The closeness and cooperation of members of Mafiosi families  
39  
40 are demonstrated by the loyalty of a niece of a gambling associate of Santo  
41  
42 Trafficante, Jr., a prominent Mafia leader in Florida. The niece was  
43  
44 employed by a Florida telephone company. When another government agency  
45  
46 made inquiries of the telephone company concerning members of the Trafficante  
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48 group, news of the inquiry soon reached Trafficante or his associates. (92-2781-  
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50 39)  
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Another example of family cooperation was the aid given to Russell

Bufalino, a Pittston, Pennsylvania, Mafioso who is presently under a

deportation order for having fraudulently claimed American birth. According

to immigration authorities, he was actually born in Sicily. About 1940, a

cousin of Bufalino, who was employed by the local government in Pittston,

made an illegal entry in the records of Orphan's Court to reflect, as Bufalino

has claimed for years, that he was born in the United States. (92-2956-7; 92-2839-8; 23;  
27, p. 6; 30; 63-596-12, 17) Phila Inquirer,

Many Mafiosi in the United States are related to one another through 4/3/58, p. 25)

marriage. Intermarriages serve as a means of establishing, strengthening,

and consolidating personal power in the Mafia. The frequent association of

members of various Mafia families often leads to the altar. There is also

the likelihood that many marriages between members of Mafia families are

contracted by family heads. This probably explains the marriage of Carmella

Profaci, daughter of Mafioso Joseph Profaci, of New York City, to Anthony

Tocco, son of Mafioso William "Black Bill" Tocco, of Detroit. Another of

Profaci's daughters, Rosalie, is married to Anthony Zerilli, son of Joseph

Zerilli, Mafia head in Detroit. (100-42303-28, p. 12; 92-2834-2)

Profaci's wife is the sister of Joseph Magliocco, a close associate

of Profaci. James La Duca, who attended the top-level meeting of 61

# TYPICAL INTERMARRIAGES OF MAFIOSI



\* ATTENDED APALACHIN MEETING OF 1957

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9 Maffiosi at Apalachin, New York, in November, 1957, is married to the  
10 daughter of Steven Magaddino, Mafia leader in Buffalo. In early 1958, Angela  
11 Barbara, the daughter of Joseph Barbara, Sr., who was the host at the  
12 Apalachin gathering, became engaged to Joseph Monachino. The latter is the  
13 son of Sam Monachino of Auburn, New York, who was present at the Apalachin  
14 meeting. (92-2834-18, p. 7; 92-2976-1X, p. 41; 63-4426-105, enc. behind file)  
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23 Many Maffiosi in the United States have an affinity by virtue of their  
24 common birthplace in Sicily. Thirty-five of the individuals at the Apalachin  
25 meeting were natives of Italy, of whom 30 were actually born in Sicily and two  
26 in the adjacent Italian province of Calabria.  
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31 The most notorious group of Sicilian-born Maffiosi in this country is  
32 the so-called Men of Montedoro. These Maffiosi settled in the north central  
33 part of Pennsylvania around Pittston. The story goes that shortly after the  
34 turn of the century, Steve La Torre immigrated to Pittston from Montedoro,  
35 Sicily, and soon achieved leadership of the Mafia in Pittston. He sent some  
36 money he had saved to a fellow villager named Santo Volpe to pay for the latter's  
37 boat fare from Sicily. Later, Charles Bufalino, another townsman, migrated to  
38 the same area. Volpe ultimately took charge of the Mafia when La Torre was  
39 ousted. (62-75147-37-132, pp. 155-156) (62-75147-111, pp. 271-272)  
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7 Volpe was succeeded by John Sciandra, who had likewise come  
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9 from Montedoro. Sciandra remained leader until his death in the late 1940's.  
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11 Charles Bufalino's nephew, Russell Bufalino, also a native of Montedoro, has  
12  
13 been the Mafia head since Sciandra's death. Other Men of Montedoro in  
14  
15 the Pittston area are Dominic Alaimo and Angelo Sciandra, both of whom were  
16  
17 present at the Apalachin meeting. (62-81093-30X, pp. 17, 18; 62-75147-1-168, pp. 6-7;  
18  
19 New York World Telegram and Sun, 1/13/58, pp. 1-2)  
20  
21 Most informants state that all Mafiosi are Sicilians or are descend-

22  
23 ants of immigrants from Sicily or southern Italy. Several informants believe,  
24  
25 however, that in unusual cases, non-Italians are accepted into Mafia operations.  
26  
27 One such non-Italian mentioned as a possible Mafioso was the late Benjamin  
28  
29 "Bugsy" Siegel, a prominent hoodlum who was murdered in 1947 in Beverly  
30  
31 Hills, California. (100-42303-274; 100-42303-280)  
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### 34 3. Cooperation for Mutual Benefit

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36 The Mafiosi band together for their mutual benefit. In the early  
37  
38 decades of this century, rival gangs involved in Mafia activity in this country,  
39  
40 such as extortion and bootlegging, found it to their mutual advantage to settle  
41  
42 their differences as a means of uniting Sicilian or Italian groups against  
43  
44 criminal groups or other nationalities. (100-42303-280)  
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48 Mafia leaders in one area frequently call on Mafia leaders elsewhere  
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50 to lend financial assistance, help in disciplinary matters, harbor fugitives,  
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10 and the like. In one case, an Italian who was smuggled into this country  
11 illegally from Mexico, was given aid by his brother-in-law, Peter Licavoli,  
12 a Detroit Mafioso, who hid him at the large Licavoli ranch near Tucson,  
13 Arizona. Licavoli's ranch has also been used as a hide-out for a Detroit  
14 fugitive named Tommy Viola. (62-75147-15-19, pp. 33-39; 100-42303-274)  
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21 Another instance of cooperation cited by an informant is the  
22 collaboration of Mafiosi in one area with Mafiosi elsewhere in investing  
23 money in gambling ventures in such cities as Reno and Las Vegas, Nevada,  
24 and Havana, Cuba. Cooperation, nonetheless, does not mean that the Mafiosi  
25 in one city can infringe upon or interfere with Mafia operations in another city.  
26 The jurisdiction and areas of operation of Mafia groups are carefully defined  
27 and observed. (100-42303-280)  
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#### 37 4. Secrecy and Silence

38 By reason of the Mafia code of omerta, a mantle of secrecy and  
39 silence shrouds the nature of the Mafia's activities and the identities of its  
40 leaders and adherents. The Mafia emphasizes and practices secrecy and  
41 silence to such an extent that it has successfully concealed the details of its  
42 operations and the identities of its adherents from the law, as well as from  
43 other underworld elements who have had occasion to come in contact with it.  
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All Maffiosi will publicly deny that they are Maffiosi or that they

are affiliated with any conspiratorial criminal group known as the Mafia,

usually adding that all they know about the Mafia is what they read about it

in the press. They know full well that to testify or to discuss the Mafia or

its activities would be to invite disaster, for those who have done so have

(19)  
signed their own death warrants. (100-42303-280)

When New York Mafia leader Vito Genovese was questioned by

police concerning the Apalachin meeting which he attended, he declared that

he would not talk, explaining that he did not wish to contradict anything said

by others who were at the meeting. (62-9-31-45)

Maffiosi are anxious to conceal their identities from the public and

the police in order to avoid undesirable publicity and investigation. They

often endeavor to hide their presence in localities they visit by using aliases

on hotel registers and transportation reservation lists.

Santo Trafficante, Jr., under the alias "Mr. Klein," once flew

from Havana, Cuba, to Miami, Florida, and thence to New York City. When

picked up by the New York State police at Apalachin, he tried to escape

publicity by identifying himself as "Louis Santos." This name is said to be

that of a deceased employee of a Havana gambling casino with which

Trafficante has been connected. (63-4426-32, 105; 92-2781-6, 57, pp. 50-51)



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8 5. Hatred and Disrespect for Law  
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10 The Sicilian tradition of hostility to the law, which is likewise part  
11 of omerta, is a traditional mark of the Mafia. The Mafiosi harbor a cynical  
12 and implacable hatred and disrespect for the law. Recourse to, or cooperation  
13 with, legal authorities for any reason and in any manner is considered by the  
14 Mafia to be a sign of weakness.  
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19

20 The Mafia in Sicily and Italy has been known for years to be able to  
21 arrange for the return of stolen goods as part of its extensive "protection"  
22 racket, hence implying knowledge of the commission of crimes and the criminals  
23 who perpetrated them. This familiar Mafia practice has also been employed  
24 in this country.  
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33 In Cleveland recently, the store of an Italian merchant was  
34 burglarized with a loss of about \$600 in cash. Instead of going to the police,  
35 the victim complained to Anthony Milano, brother of Frank Milano, a Mafia  
36 leader of Cleveland, now living in California. Through criminal contacts, it  
37 is said, Anthony Milano was able to secure the return of the \$600.  
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43 (63-4296-11-30)  
44

45 I respective witnesses have been murdered by Mafiosi on innumerable  
46 occasions to prevent their testifying in court. This ever-present threat of  
47 "death to informants" accounts, to a great extent, for the paucity of detailed  
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7 information concerning the Mafia in this country. It could not be expected

8  
9 not the criminal operations of the Mafia, stressing "death to informants,"

10  
11 could be easily uncovered to public view.

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13  
14 6. Corruption of Law

15  
16 The age-old practice of corrupting politicians and other public

17  
18 figures is another sign of Mafia operations. Mafiosi use their power and

19  
20 health to gain the cooperation or active assistance of public officials on

21  
22 local, state, and even national levels. Mafiosi have always been able to find

23  
24 (13)  
25 local politicians to do their bidding.

26  
27 A case in point involves a former assistant in the office of the

28  
29 Attorney General of California. This official was charged by the California

30  
31 Crime Commission with being a "mouthpiece" for the late Jack Dragna, Mafia

32  
33 leader in California. Several checks made out to this official by Dragna

34  
35 were explained as payment for legal services he had rendered Dragna in

36  
37 (14)  
38 connection with a business concern of which Dragna was treasurer. (62-75147-176, pp.  
39  
40 13-14)

41  
42 Permission to operate a "barbute" game in River Rouge, Michigan, in

43  
44 half of Peter Licavoli, a Detroit Mafioso, was reportedly obtained from

45  
46 by authorities in River Rouge by a local gambler. The mayor and the city

47  
48 councilmen of River Rouge are alleged to have received payoffs for allowing

49  
50 the Licavoli group to conduct its gambling game. (62-75147-15-81, pp. 59-60)  
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8 It has been reported that at a meeting of the leaders of one of the  
9 major political parties in the Pittston, Pennsylvania, area in the Fall of 1957,  
10 Russell Bufalino and James Osticco, Mafiosi who later attended the Apalachin  
11 meeting, agreed to contribute \$12,000 to the campaign fund on one condition.  
12 This stipulation was that, in the event of the victory of the party's slate,  
13 Osticco would be named police chief of Pittston. However, as a result of the  
14 publicity arising from the Apalachin meeting, Osticco did not get the appointment.  
15 (92-2839-27; Washington Evening Star, 6/26/58, p. 10)

16 Following his attendance at the Apalachin meeting, Frank Desimone,  
17 a Mafioso and attorney of Los Angeles, had his eyes examined by a New York  
18 City physician. Desimone had been referred to this doctor by United States  
19 Congressman Alfred E. Santangelo, of New York City, who also accompanied  
20 Desimone to the doctor's office. Santangelo is reported to be married to the  
21 daughter of Charles Rao, an alleged Mafioso, whose brother, Vincent Rao,  
22 also a Mafioso, was present at Apalachin. Santangelo and Vincent Rao jointly  
23 purchased real estate in New York City. (63-4296-26-115; 62-9-34-183)

24 It is interesting to observe that when Desimone was served with a  
25 subpoena by a Federal grand jury in New York City after Apalachin, his legal  
26 counsel was an attorney who has space in Santangelo's law office. (63-4296-26-115.  
27 62-9-34-183)

28 Allegations have been made against various Congressmen that they  
29 sponsored bills in Congress designed to prevent the deportation of criminals



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8 as undesirable aliens. The name of the late Congressman Vito Marcantonio,  
9  
10 of New York City, received notoriety in this connection. Marcantonio is also

11  
12 said to have arranged, in the late 1940's, for the appointment of the son of

13  
14 Mafioso Thomas "Three Fingers" Luchese to the United States Military

15  
16 Academy. (100-28126-66, p. 110, 39-2141-A, New York Journal-American, 2/27/47;  
17 100-86033-A, Kansas City Times, 7/26/55)

18  
19 The persistent efforts of Mafiosi to purchase police protection have

20  
21 always been typical of their cynical disdain for law enforcement in general.

22  
23 To them "money can buy anyone." In Detroit, in 1955, a Mafioso named

24  
25 Anthony Giacalone was convicted, fined \$500, and sentenced to eight months

26  
27 in jail for attempting to bribe a member of the Detroit Police Department's

28  
29 racket squad. Giacalone had contacted the policeman at his home and proposed

30  
31 that he act as an informant for him at \$500 a week. Giacalone expressed a

32  
33 desire to ascertain the identities of those racketeers under investigation and

34  
35 to learn when police raids on gambling operations were scheduled, so that

36  
37 he could protect his interests. (62-75147-15-75, pp. 33-34, Detroit Times, 1/5/55)

38  
39 Several years ago, it was reported that a clerk in the office of the

40  
41 Detroit Police Department's vice squad was on the payroll of Peter Licavoli,

42  
43 Detroit Mafia leader and gambling chief in that city. The clerk is said to have

44  
45 tipped off Licavoli when search warrants were issued for a raid on Licavoli's

46  
47 gambling operations. (62-75147-15-55, p. 58)

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7 In New York City, in the middle 1940's, Anthony Strollo, Mafia  
8 leader of the Lower West Side, allegedly had a police captain in his pay, as  
9 well as a policeman working for him as a tip-off man. (62-75147-22X)  
10

11  
12 A former police department official in Utica, New York, has admitted  
13 being friendly with associates of Joseph and Salvatore Falcone, Mafiosi of that  
14 city, who attended the Apalachin meeting. The Falcones have been reported  
15 to conduct an Italian lottery in Utica. This official is said to have  
16 remarked that he has gone on hunting and fishing trips with associates of the  
17 Falcones. (62-75147-1-170, pp. 1-3)  
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27 7. Intimidation and Vengeance  
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29 The element of fear plays a potent part in the Mafia scheme of  
30 things. Mafia operations are carried out by arousing the natural fear of people  
31 for their lives, families, and property. Threats of reprisal have been utilized  
32 by Mafiosi in this country with the same deadly effectiveness achieved in Sicily  
33 over the years.  
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40 Refusal to comply with Mafia "suggestions" or orders has frequently  
41 resulted in violence, including death by shooting, knifing, or beating. Other  
42 techniques, such as, the bombing or burning of property, have been employed as  
43 retaliatory measures. Those who have the temerity to resist soon feel the  
44 wrath of the Mafia. Mafia vengeance is swift, certain, and merciless.  
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51 (100-42303-274)  
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Mafiosi have used the system of surveying criminal activities and  
legitimate businesses to find profitable sources of income. They then approach  
their victim with the "suggestion" that he permit a Mafioso to enter the  
venture as a "partner" or an "associate." The order is given to the victim  
that a certain amount of money is to be forthcoming in a lump sum or in  
regular stipulated payments in exchange for "protection." Mafiosi might  
also require the owner of a building to make available his premises to the  
Mafia for the operation of a legitimate business. (100-42303-274, 280)

In Detroit, for example, an Italian merchant, owning his own building  
and an adjoining one, leased the latter building, at a monthly rental of \$300,  
to a nursery firm whose concealed owner is Peter Licavoli, a leading Mafioso.  
The merchant was never paid any rent and thereupon appealed to Detroit Mafia  
leader Joseph Zerilli personally. Several days later, some of Licavoli's  
associates informed the merchant that they needed the building for another  
season and suggested that he forget about collecting any rent and forego  
procuring the services of an attorney. The merchant, who is familiar with  
the brazenness and ruthlessness of such hoodlums, fears that the Mafia may  
eventually require him to turn over the deed to the property. (100-42303-287)



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There are countless instances, of course, in which Mafiosi have extorted money from criminals engaged in such illegal activities as bookmaking, illegal alcohol, and prostitution, as well as from individuals conducting legitimate businesses.

One of the most outrageous types of traditional Mafia intimidation is the use of direct or indirect threats against prospective witnesses in court trials involving Mafiosi. Dominic Oliveto, a Mafia leader who was at the Apalachin meeting, was arrested some years ago in connection with an especially vicious assault. He was charged with posing as a Federal officer, striking the victim on the head with a crank handle, forcing him into an automobile, and later throwing the victim out of the car. Notwithstanding all this bodily harm he inflicted, when the case was brought to court, the victim, an Italian, was so frightened by the possibility of additional Mafia violence that he insisted he had identified the "wrong man." The case, naturally, was not-prossed. (92-2912-5, C)

In 1942, a police officer and a bootlegger were killed in Hamtramck, Michigan. Several witnesses were found, leading to the arrest and indictment of two suspects. One of the suspects was an Italian with a Mafia background and connections. At the trial, a directed verdict of not guilty was reached when

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8 the fear-stricken witnesses refused to name the two suspects as the men  
9  
10 they had seen commit the murders. (62-75147-15-19, pp. 33-39)  
11

12  
13 8. Murder  
14

15 Murder has long been a traditional and oft-used method of criminals--  
16  
17 especially Mafiosi--to (1) instill fear and serve as a warning, (2) remove  
18  
19 opposition, (3) exact revenge against informants, (4) settle disputes, or  
20  
21 (5) make a living.  
22

23  
24 The Mafia and murder are generally considered to be synonymous,  
25  
26 for over the years Mafiosi have killed freely although not capriciously. The  
27  
28 death of a certain individual is not a matter decided by ordinary Mafiosi.  
29  
30 Mafia leaders are said to make the final decision as to death, although the  
31  
32 lesser Mafiosi can make suggestions and reports concerning murders deemed  
33  
34 necessary or expedient. (100-42303-280)  
35  
36

37  
38 Countless Mafiosi have been investigated and arrested in gang  
39  
40 killings and other deaths, but most of them have been freed due to a lack  
41  
42 of sufficient evidence as to their guilt or complicity. Associates of these  
43  
44 suspects have been questioned time and again, but they invariably invoke  
45  
46 the customary Mafia silence.  
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8 The use of murder as a silencing weapon by Mafiosi is graphically  
9  
10 illustrated in the murder of Ferdinand "The Shadow" Boccia in Brooklyn in  
11  
12 1934. The beginning of the end of Boccia was portended when he demanded  
13  
14 \$25,000 from the Vito Genovese gang, an infamous Mafia group. Boccia  
15  
16 claimed this sum as his share for setting up a victim for "fleecing" in a  
17  
18 crooked card game. The victim had lost \$150,000. When Boccia became too  
19  
20 insistent, Ernest "The Hawk" Rupolo was approached by Genovese and Mike  
21  
22 Miranda, both of whom, 23 years later, were at the Apalachin, New York,  
23  
24 meeting. Rupolo was instructed to "finger" Boccia, so that Genovese's  
25  
26 gunmen could kill him. Boccia was subsequently killed in a restaurant.  
27  
28 (64-31396-34, p. 7; 137-846-22)  
29  
30 Although the police believed Genovese was implicated in Boccia's  
31  
32 murder, they had insufficient evidence on which to secure an indictment  
33  
34 against him. (15) During the mid-1930's, Genovese traveled to Italy from time to  
35  
36 time, reportedly to escape the rackets investigations of District Attorney  
37  
38 Thomas E. Dewey. In August, 1944, Rupolo, who had served a prison term for  
39  
40 another shooting, began to talk about the Boccia killing. He had pleaded guilty  
41  
42 to another "killing for hire," and, under the threat of a longer sentence as a  
43  
44 second offender, he decided to talk despite the omerta code of silence. He  
45  
46 blamed the killing on Mafiosi. As a result, indictments were returned against  
47  
48 Genovese, Miranda, and four others for the Boccia murder. (16) (62-81093-34-48,  
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9 The search for Genovese led to Italy, where he had served as an  
10 interpreter for the Allied Military Government during World War II. Later,  
11  
12  
13 he had been arrested by United States military police for black-market oper-  
14  
15  
16 tions and confined to a military jail in Italy. He was extradited and turned  
17  
18 over to the New York City police to answer the murder charge. Genovese  
19  
20 pleaded not guilty. (17) (32-28427-97)

21  
22 Corroboration of Rupolo's story of murder depended upon the  
23  
24 testimony of two witnesses. One of the witnesses, Peter La Tempa, who was  
25  
26 being held in a Brooklyn jail, was found dead in his cell in January, 1945. A  
27  
28  
29 toxicological examination showed the cause of death was an overdose of  
30  
31 sleeping tablets. Rupolo expressed his belief that La Tempa had been murdered  
32  
33 by Genovese or one of his hirelings. (18) [REDACTED] b7D

34  
35  
36 The other witness was Jeremiah Esposito. His bullet-riddled  
37  
38 body was thrown from a speeding automobile in Norwood, New Jersey. The  
39  
40 deaths of Esposito and La Tempa resulted in the dismissal of the indictments  
41  
42 against Genovese, Miranda, and the others. (64-31396-34, pp. 10, 17, 18)

43  
44  
45 In 1940, a notorious criminal group was uncovered in New York  
46  
47 City through the admissions of several young gangsters who had been indicted  
48  
49 for stealing automobiles later used in the commission of murder. These  
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7 witnesses revealed the existence of a vast criminal syndicate which the  
8  
9 underworld referred to as the "Combination," and to which the press gave  
10 (19)  
11 the appellation "Murder, Inc."

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13  
14 Murder, Inc., was the brain child of Louis "Lepke" Buchalter, who  
15  
16 was later sentenced to death and electrocuted. It was staffed by hoodlums of  
17  
18 different nationalities. and specialized in intimidation, extortion, violence,  
19  
20 and murder. Prominent among its personnel was a corps of gunmen called  
21  
22 "troops" who gunned, knifed, or beat victims. It is estimated that between  
23  
24 60 and 80 individuals were killed by Murder, Inc. (20)  
25  
26

27  
28 The leader of the Brooklyn "troops" and "chief executioner" of  
29  
30 Murder, Inc., was Mafioso Albert Anastasia, who was to meet his own violent  
31 (1950 secret report of Federal Bureau of Narcotics)  
32 death in typical gangland fashion by unknown assailants in a hotel barbershop  
33  
34 in midtown Manhattan in October, 1957. Anastasia was an associate of such  
35  
36 infamous Mafiosi as Vito Genovese, Joseph Profaci, Frank Costello, and  
37  
38 (21)  
39 Santo Trafficante, Jr.  
40

41  
42 One of the most important witnesses against Murder, Inc., and  
43  
44 Anastasia was Abe Reles. Reles stated that he had been with Anastasia when  
45  
46 the details of one murder were being planned. During the time Reles was  
47  
48 furnishing information to the district attorney and to the police, he was held in  
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8 protective custody for over 20 months at the Half Moon Hotel near Coney  
9  
10 island, New York, as a precaution against gang retaliation. Despite what  
11  
12 was believed to be an adequate police guard, in November, 1941, Reles died  
13  
14 under mysterious circumstances. His fully clothed body was found on a roof  
15  
16 top four stories below his room. One speculation is that he died trying to  
17  
18 escape by means of a sheet hanging from his window. Other theories are that  
19  
20 he committed suicide and that he was thrown from the window by unknown  
21  
22 (22) (23)  
23 persons.

24  
25 Another instance which illustrates how Mafia vengeance is wreaked  
26  
27 on those who violate the code of silence was the murder of a potential  
28  
29 criminal informant in 1957. This potential informant, who said that he  
30  
31 had been born into the Mafia, since his father had been affiliated with  
32  
33 it for years, had furnished information on the form and characteristics  
34  
35 of the Mafia as he knew them. The informant's body was found in the trunk  
36  
37 of his car in the outskirts of Detroit following his testimony before a grand  
38  
39 jury inquiring into crime in and around Flint, Michigan. (100-42303-244; 62-75147-15-  
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41 82, pp. 99-101; 15-25299-7, Detroit Free Press,  
42  
43 April 3, 1957)  
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8 II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAFIA AND CRIME IN GENERAL  
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11 A. Enormity of Crime Today  
12

13 According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, in 1957 the total  
14 estimated crimes, ranging from minor larceny to murder, numbered over  
15 two and three-quarter million. For the same period, the total cost of crimes  
16 against property was estimated at nearly 500 million dollars. The crimes  
17 represented by these figures cover the entire United States, both rural and  
18 city areas, and were committed by individuals and groups of individuals of all  
19 nationalities and backgrounds. (24)  
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29 To say that all of the crimes reported were inspired, committed, or  
30 directed by the Mafia would be ridiculous and untrue. The Kefauver Committee,  
31 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, FBI sources, and local law enforcement  
32 agencies have determined that the Mafia is not responsible for all--or even  
33 nearly all--crime in this country. The fact remains, however, that the Mafia  
34 is deeply involved in organized crime.  
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43 B. Mafia and Organized Crime  
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45 The large organized criminal groups of today are a decided  
46 contrast to the relatively small predatory criminal gangs which perpetrate  
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8 such crimes as bank robberies, burglaries, and automobile thefts. Organized  
9  
10 criminal groups have turned from primarily rapacious crimes to lucrative  
11 and continuing forms of crime, such as gambling, narcotics, bootlegging,  
12 and business and labor racketeering. They have taken on some of the  
13  
14 organizational methods and attributes of modern business in order to exploit  
15  
16 new fields of illicit profit. Current criminal groups are multipurpose in nature,  
17  
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21  
22 engaging in any and all rackets and activities in which money can be made. (25)

23  
24 The Kevauver Committee observed that the Mafia has a part in  
25  
26 "binding together in loose association" some of the major criminal syndicates,  
27  
28 as well as many minor gangs and individual hoodlums, throughout the country.  
29  
30 The Committee also reported that Mafia leaders are to be found in the most  
31  
32 profitable rackets in many cities. This information is substantiated by Bureau  
33  
34 sources who have reported that Mafia leaders in many cities are involved in  
35  
36 syndicates but that the Mafia cannot be considered as synonymous with  
37  
38  
39 (26)  
40 syndicates.

41  
42 The Mafia, therefore, is a part of the whole of organized crime.  
43  
44 According to Bureau sources, many syndicates are composed of persons  
45  
46 not of Sicilian-Italian descent, although the leaders or top men of a number  
47  
48 of syndicates are Mafiosi who make policy and see that it is carried out.  
49  
50 There are only a comparatively few Mafiosi in each city or area where  
51  
52  
53 syndicates are in existence.  
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Mafiosi are not interested in sporadic crimes, such as, robberies, burglaries, or larcenies. What Mafiosi prefer and specialize in are the vastly more profitable and more enduring criminal activities which cater to the weaknesses and appetites of people. Hence, they have concentrated, for the most part, on such big-time criminal ventures as (1) gambling, (2) illicit narcotics traffic, (3) labor and industrial racketeering, and (4) bootlegging.

Many times, Mafiosi do not directly participate in the criminal activities in which they have an interest, but see to it, by their methods of intimidation, violence, and extortion, that a percentage of the income derived from legal and illegal enterprises is allocated to them. (100-42303-274, 2)

It is necessary to make a distinction between Italians in crime and Mafiosi in crime. Most informants say that the Mafiosi are individuals of Sicilian origin or descent and that only occasionally are other Italian criminals accepted into the Mafia. The Sicilians comprising the Mafia are said to be feared by other Italian criminal elements. The Kefauver Committee pointed out that the Mafia embodies only a "very small fraction of a percentage" of Sicilians, and no derogatory inference should be drawn about Sicilians generally because the vast majority of citizens of Sicilian and Italian extraction are law-abiding.

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8 III. EARLY HISTORY OF MAFIA  
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11 Transition of Mafia to United States  
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13 The United States was the land of opportunity for hundreds of  
14  
15 thousands of Italians and Sicilians in the latter part of the 19th Century and  
16  
17 the early decades of the 20th Century. Social, economic, and political  
18  
19 conditions in Italy, and especially in Sicily, became unbearable to many in  
20  
21 the poorer classes who finally saw fit to migrate to the new world westward  
22  
23 in search of a better life.  
24  
25

26 This country furnished a natural haven for many Sicilians and  
27  
28 Italians engaged in Mafia activities who were being sought by the Italian  
29  
30 police. During the 1920's, this was particularly true. Mussolini used strong  
31  
32 measures in an effort to rid Italy of the Mafia, causing numerous Mafiosi  
33  
34 to flee to the United States. Many entered illegally, some of them with the  
35  
36 (28) (29)  
37 aid of Mafiosi here. (100-42303-274)  
38  
39

40 On account of a growing population of Sicilians and Italians, Mafiosi  
41  
42 coming to this country were able to find large communities of their countrymen  
43  
44 from whom they could continue to prey upon and exploit. The fear of the Mafia and  
45  
46 the general reluctance to trust law enforcement officers made honest, hard-  
47  
48 working Italian immigrants the perfect soil in which the transplanted Mafiosi  
49  
50 (30) (31)  
51 could continue to flourish criminally. (100-42303-280, 282, 317; 63-4426-32)  
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10 B. New Orleans Incidents

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12 New Orleans, with a sizable Italian population, was one of the first  
13 American cities to experience the plague of the Mafia. By 1890, there had  
14 been close to a hundred reported Mafia murders in New Orleans. These  
15 murders were part of the bloody history of vendetta practiced by Sicilians and  
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(32)  
Italians familiar with Mafia methods.

A number of Mafia incidents occurred in the early 1890's in that  
city, one of which culminated in the severance of diplomatic relations between  
Italy and the United States for a brief period. The specific episode involved  
the lynching of a group of eleven Italians implicated in the murder of  
New Orleans Police Chief David G. Hennessy as a result of his investigation  
of numerous Mafia-type operations and killings. (100-42303-284)  
(33)

Two reasons for Hennessy's murder were advanced. The first  
reason was to avenge his arrest of an Italian bandit who had been extradited  
to Italy to stand trial. Hennessy was said to have been offered a bribe of  
\$5,000 to retract his identification of that bandit. (100-42303-284)

The second reason was to prevent Hennessy's intended testimony  
against one of two feuding factions of the Italian community which sought  
domination of the New Orleans waterfront. As a result of a number of



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7 vendetta killings, Hennessy called the warring factions together and obtained  
8  
9 their agreement to stop. But violence soon broke out anew between them.

11  
12 Two days after Hennessy publicly announced that he would testify on behalf  
13  
14 of one faction at a trial, he was murdered. (100-42303-284)  
15

16 In the subsequent trial of eleven Italians for the murder, ten days  
17  
18 were necessary to examine nearly 800 prospective jurors before a jury could  
19  
20 be impaneled. In March, 1891, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" as  
21  
22 to eight, but was unable to reach an agreement as to three others. All were  
23  
24 returned to jail in view of a second indictment pending against them.  
25  
26 (100-42303-284)

27 Strong public feeling was aroused by the verdict. The day following  
28  
29 the end of the trial, a crowd of angry New Orleans citizens stormed the jail,  
30  
31 seized the defendants, hanged two, and shot and killed nine. The Italian  
32  
33 Government protested the lynching, but the state and local authorities took  
34  
35 no action against the lynch mob despite pleas from the United States Secretary  
36  
37 of State. Italy thereupon severed diplomatic relations with this country  
38  
39 (34)  
40  
41 during 1891-1892.  
42

43 Other incidents of extortion, kidnaping, and murder took place in  
44  
45 the Italian community in New Orleans during the 1890's and in the first  
46  
47 decade of the 1900's. As a consequence of the kidnaping of the son of a  
48  
49 prominent funeral director in 1907, an Italian vigilante committee was  
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8 organized by civic and political leaders. Not only did the vigilante committee  
9 assist in bringing the kidnapers to trial, but it also helped to calm the fear  
10 of the Mafia among the Italian population. (100-42303-284)  
11

12  
13 C. Black Hand Period of Mafia, 1900-1920  
14

15  
16 1. Background  
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18  
19 New Orleans, of course, was only one of many American cities  
20 to feel the baleful influence of the Mafia in their Italian communities. Mafia-  
21 type activities were likewise carried on in other large cities with substantial  
22 Italian populations, such as, New York City, Chicago, Kansas City,\* and  
23 San Francisco.  
24  
25

26  
27 From 1900 to 1920, the Mafia often manifested itself through  
28 so-called Black Hand activities which became widespread in many Sicilian-  
29 Italian communities. According to one source, the Black Hand was a name  
30 invented by a newspaperman covering an Italian bomb extortion case in which  
31 the threatening note contained an inked handprint as an identifying mark.  
32  
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34  
35 Black Hand activities, which included intimidation, terror, extortion,  
36 kidnaping, and murder, were conducted by Mafiosi and other Italian criminals  
37 with relative success because of the temperament of the Sicilian-Italian  
38 victims and their inborn dread of these familiar methods. The Mafiosi who  
39 committed Black Hand crimes worked alone and sometimes in pairs or in  
40 (35, 36, 37, 38, 39)  
41 small groups.  
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45 \* Whenever Kansas City is mentioned in this monograph, it refers to  
46 Kansas City, Missouri.  
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10 2. New York City

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12 At the turn of the century, New York City had the largest Italian  
13  
14 population--approximately 500,000--of any city in the United States. By  
15  
16 1908, Black Hand depredations in that city, including those perpetrated by  
17  
18 Mafiosi, had become so numerous and so flagrant that they were considered  
19  
20  
21 to be the worst in any city in the country. They took the form of dynamiting of  
22 (40) (41)  
23 houses and shops, kidnaping of children, and blackmailing.

24  
25 Black Hand bombings by Mafiosi of houses and stores in New York City  
26  
27 were the consequence of the refusal of victims to comply with demands for  
28  
29 money or other favors. Sometimes a successful Italian merchant would be  
30  
31 ordered to make a payment if he wished to stay in business; if he failed to  
32  
33 fulfill this demand, his business establishment or home would be bombed  
34  
35 (42) (43)  
36 or set on fire.

37  
38  
39 The violence inflicted on victims by Mafiosi in Black Hand crimes  
40  
41 was often horrible. One detective assigned to Black Hand investigations  
42  
43 reported that an Italian gang which ran a bakery in Brooklyn used the ovens  
44  
45 (44)  
46 to cremate the bodies of their victims.

47  
48 While Mafiosi generally operated in Black Hand crimes as  
49  
50 individuals or small groups in New York City during these years, extortion  
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rackets were also conducted on an organized scale by larger groups of  
Mafiosi. These groups, comprised of criminals steeped in Mafia tactics, were  
involved in "shakedowns" which have always been a Mafia trademark.

A former prosecuting attorney in New York City cited the influence  
the Mafia exerted in the wholesale trade of Sicilian lemons in that city. An  
Italian established himself as a lemon broker and within a short period had  
cornered most of the lemon business among Italian fruit wholesalers. Under  
his "protection," these wholesalers agreed to buy lemons from growers he  
represented in Sicily. The Italian merchants were quick to recognize this  
broker as a Capo Mafioso, or Mafia leader, and knew that harm might befall  
(45)  
their relatives in Sicily if his dictates were not obeyed.

In 1909, Lieutenant Giuseppe Petrosino, of the New York City police  
department, who was investigating Italian criminal groups, including Mafiosi,  
journeyed to Sicily to check the criminal records of some 1,000 Italian  
criminals and ex-convicts then operating in New York City. Petrosino was  
ambushed and murdered in a public square in Palermo, Sicily, on the evening  
of his arrival.

The Petrosino murder aroused much concern among law enforcement  
officials, because it was patent that news of Petrosino's trip had reached



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Mafiosi in Sicily before his arrival. He was murdered as revenge for his efforts in gathering evidence to prosecute or deport their Mafia comrades in the United States. (46)

By World War I, Black Hand activities in New York City were on the wane due mainly to aggressive police action in apprehending Black Hand criminals, the protective custody afforded witnesses, and the accumulation of sufficient evidence for successful prosecution. More and more Italians felt safe in filing complaints with the police against Black Hand criminals. (47) (48)

3. Chicago

In Chicago, as in New York City, numerous small gangs of two or three Mafiosi conducted their systematic Black Hand blackmail, extortion, and murder in the Italian community. They took advantage of Italian family solidarity in levying tribute, the victims being pressured into acceding to their demands for committing crimes for fear of harm to members of their families. This repudiation extended to the point of refusing to notify the police of threats received. The tradition of the Mafia--death to informants--was enough to convince victims of the danger in taking their problems to the police and of the desirability of pleading ignorance or inability to identify the principals. (49, 50, 51)

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11 A rather fatalistic attitude was assumed by some police toward  
12  
13 Black Hand killings and bombings, since the silence of victims and witnesses  
14  
15 alike proved almost insurmountable. The fact that police were unable to  
16  
17 prevent or solve these crimes only tended to increase the disinclination of  
18  
19 (52)  
20 Italians to look to law enforcement as a solution to their dilemma.

21  
22 According to Chicago newspaper reports, there were 40 Black Hand  
23  
24 murders in 1911, 33 in 1912, 31 in 1913, and 42 in 1914. One author claims  
25  
26 (53) (54)  
27 that there have been 300 Black Hand murders in Chicago since 1890.

28  
29 - As early as 1907, an organization called the White Hand was formed  
30  
31 to combat Black Hand criminals in various American cities. The White Hand,  
32  
33 composed of Italians, had as its object cooperation with the police and the law.  
34  
35 In Chicago, it was supported by the Italian Chamber of Commerce, the local  
36  
37 Italian newspaper, and several Italian and Sicilian fraternal orders. The  
38  
39 White Hand sent investigators to Sicily and Italy to unearth the criminal records  
40  
41 of Black Hand criminals in an effort to have them deported from the United States  
42  
43 (55)  
44 However, little more was heard of the White Hand after 1910.

47 4. Kansas City

48  
49 In Kansas City, the Italian community was likewise beset by  
50  
51 Black Hand depredations during 1900-1920. Extortion notes were received by  
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8 businessmen in the "Little Italy" section of the city, demanding sums of money  
9  
10 ranging from \$50 to \$5,000. The conspiracy of silence and the intimidation of  
11  
12 witnesses were so complete at one time that, despite the arrests of numerous  
13  
14 Black Hand criminals, including Mafiosi, the chief of police admitted that  
15  
16 prosecution was virtually impossible. (74-1392-12, p. 5)  
17  
18

19 5. West Coast  
20

21 Black Hand pillage also extended to the west coast in the early  
22  
23 1900's. It was the same story there, with the familiar techniques of  
24  
25 intimidation, extortion, violence, revenge, and murder being used with  
26  
27 devastating effect against the residents of Italian communities.  
28  
29 (62-75157-26-426, pp. 25-26)

30 D. Black Hand Activities of Mafia, 1920 to Date  
31

32 Although there have been many alleged Black Hand incidents  
33  
34 since 1920, it is apparent that most so-called Black Hand letters have been  
35  
36 employed by persons trying to capitalize on the fear such communications  
37  
38 have generated in Italian communities in this country in the past. Some of  
39  
40 the extortion cases with Black Hand insignia investigated by the Bureau indicate  
41  
42 that Black Hand methods have also been used by non-Italians against non-Italian  
43  
44 (56)  
45 victims. (62-9448-1, 15; 9-1914; 9-1891-5; 62-108-2405; 66-2542-2912x; 9-2334;  
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47 9-6649; 9-6666; 9-1535; 9-3648; 9-23841-2, 5, 9)  
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8 It appears that effective police campaigns against Black Hand  
9  
10 criminals during 1910-1929 somewhat frustrated Mafiosi in their efforts to  
11  
12 make money by intimidation, extortion, terror, and murder of their victims.  
13  
14 However, the advent of the Prohibition era was to offer Mafiosi new and  
15  
16 greater opportunities for their special brand of criminality.  
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8 IV. MAFIA DURING PROHIBITION  
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11 A. Bootlegging  
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13 1. General  
14

15 Mafia operations in the United States were still comparatively  
16 limited at the time the 18th Amendment to the Constitution became effective  
17 in 1920. The advent of Prohibition brought the Mafia to fruition. Mafiosi  
18 who had engaged in Black Hand intimidation, extortion, kidnaping, and  
19 murder found Prohibition made to order for their type of crime. At the  
20 beginning of the "dry" era, Mafiosi were operating individually and in  
21 small groups, but by the time of repeal in 1933 there were large, organized  
22 Mafia gangs, many of which cooperated with other gangs outside their own areas.  
23 (57) (58)  
24 (62-75147-15-19, pp. 24-25)

25 The wealth and influence achieved by Mafiosi before 1920 were  
26 insignificant compared to what they had achieved by the end of Prohibition.  
27 To Mafiosi, the manufacture and sale of illegal liquor was the ring on which  
28 they cut their teeth. There were enormous "shakedown" profits to be  
29 derived from the production of illegal alcohol. The leader of one criminal  
30 gang made a practice of approaching Italians running illicit stills and  
31 demanding a certain percentage of the alcohol produced. That leader also  
32 decreed that those stills should be operated by a certain number of his own  
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11 men, from whose wages he would take a cut. Refusal to comply with  
12 (59)  
13 these orders brought the threat of retribution.  
14

15 Prohibition was a time of violence and bloodshed as gangs in the  
16 big cities vied for power. Hence, lengthy intergang warfare was rampant in  
17 metropolitan areas. A heavy toll was exacted among gangs and gangsters as  
18 they struggled for the illicit spoils of Prohibition. In 1927, during the  
19 peak of gang wars in St. Louis, an average of one Italian a day was murdered  
20 during the course of a month's time. (60)  
21  
22

23 From the violence, gunsmoke, and blood of Prohibition days were  
24 to emerge the organized criminal groups as we know them today--the big  
25 "syndicates" with their "respectable" business-type leaders, their lawyers,  
26 (61) (62)  
27 their "specialists," and their use of legitimate businesses as "fronts."  
28

29 Prohibition brought Mafia operations out of the Italian community  
30 and into the community at large in order to satisfy the desire of many  
31 citizens to quench their thirst. The 18th Amendment endowed the Mafia  
32 with fabulous funds and took it from the isolated Italian quarters and bestowed  
33 it on the cities as a whole. (63)  
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36 Typical of criminal operations in the Mafia tradition were the boot-  
37 legging activities of the 1920's and early 1930's in Kansas City and Chicago.  
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11 2. Kansas City  
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13 Kansas City had its share of Black Hand activities during the  
14  
15 period 1900-1920 when Italian criminals operated in the north end of the  
16  
17 city. During these two decades, Black Hand criminals acquired much valuable  
18  
19 experience which was to serve them well during Prohibition.  
20

21  
22 With the beginning of Prohibition, a number of small Italian  
23  
24 criminal groups came into conflict with one another over the sale of sugar  
25  
26 to bootleggers, as well as the theft of sugar. Many murders and beatings  
27  
28 occurred as a result of this internecine warfare. (92-2813-3)  
29

30  
31 In 1923, an enterprising Italian opened a sugar warehouse to  
32  
33 supply that commodity to illicit distillers. He was later approached by  
34  
35 local Mafiosi who wanted to "muscle in" on his sales. An agreement was  
36  
37 reached and a corporation with about 18 members was formed which has  
38  
39 been called the "Sugar House" syndicate. Each member was given equal  
40  
41 shares in the business, and profits were distributed accordingly. (92-2813-3)  
42  
43  
44

45 The Sugar House syndicate was a Mafia monopoly by virtue of its  
46  
47 absolute control of the illegal liquor trade in Kansas City. Its income was  
48  
49 realized in a variety of ingenious ways. By gaining sole control over sugar  
50  
51 distribution to still owners, the syndicate was in a position to rig the price  
52  
53 of sugar sold. Most sugar was bought in freight-carload lots, but some of  
54  
55 it was obtained at no cost whatever--it was stolen. (92-2813-3)  
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8 The Sugar House syndicate sold its product on a cash basis. Those  
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10 still operators who did not possess ready cash to pay for the sugar were  
11  
12 permitted to pay in installments but were charged an exorbitant interest rate.  
13  
14 Sugar was made available to still operators on the condition that they sell the  
15  
16 liquor back to the syndicate at the wholesale price of five dollars a gallon.  
17  
18 The syndicate then retailed it for three times that figure. (92-2813-3)  
19

20  
21 The syndicate also controlled the sale and financing of automobiles  
22  
23 used by these illicit liquor manufacturers. Competing groups were permitted  
24  
25 by the syndicate to operate on a small scale in the sugar and liquor business,  
26  
27 provided the syndicate received a percentage of their profits. (92-2813-3)  
28

29  
30 Members of the Sugar House syndicate became rich as a result of  
31  
32 their monopolistic venture. Following the repeal of Prohibition, they put  
33  
34 their illegally accumulated wealth to use by establishing legitimate beer and  
35  
36 liquor distributorships. (92-2813-3)  
37  
38

39  
40 3. Chicago  
41

42 The story of Prohibition in Chicago is the story of the Capone gang.  
43  
44 At the start of Prohibition in Chicago, thousands of residents of the Italian  
45  
46 community were organized into a veritable army of alcohol makers. It  
47  
48 has been claimed that at one time 80 per cent of the families in the Italian  
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8 colony of that city were involved in the production of alcohol by home  
9  
10 stills. The easy money to be realized from bootlegging appealed to these  
11  
12 people and was a major cause of conflict between the many gangs of Italians  
13  
14 (64) (65) (66)  
15 and other nationalities.  
16

17 "Scarface" Al Capone began his rise to notoriety as the body-  
18  
19 guard for Johnny Torrio, who had imported him from Brooklyn. Torrio had  
20  
21 succeeded "Big Jim" Colosimo, the top gangster of Chicago's South Side,  
22  
23 (67)  
24 when the latter was murdered in 1920.  
25

26 Torrio proceeded to extend and to consolidate his bootlegging,  
27  
28 gambling, and vice operations over the entire metropolitan area with the aid of  
29  
30 bought police and political protection. He was also successful in reaching  
31  
32 agreements with different gangs by the familiar Mafia system of assigning  
33  
34 (68)  
35 territories for criminal operations.  
36

37  
38 In 1924, Torrio was the victim of an ambush in which he nearly  
39  
40 lost his life. He saw fit to "retire" and to turn over his reins to Capone.  
41  
42 For a few years after Torrio's retirement, the political and police protective  
43  
44  
45  
46 While evidence is not available to show conclusively that Al Capone was one  
47  
48 of the Mafiosi, he was in contact with them and he used Mafia-type methods.  
49  
50 Therefore, a brief reference to his criminal career is made here to round  
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52 out the picture of the Mafia.  
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8 system he had built up broke down and a succession of fierce "beer wars"  
9  
10 erupted between gangs which had formerly cooperated and limited their  
11  
12 territories. A truce was declared in 1928 only after much violence and  
13  
14 bloodshed had been expended. Capone secured the territory in south Chicago  
15  
16 for his beer distribution, but obtained a monopoly over the entire city for  
17  
18 (69) (70)  
19 his gambling ventures.  
20

21  
22 Much of the personnel for the Capone gang was recruited from a  
23  
24 Sicilian mutual aid society known as the Unione Siciliano. The Unione Siciliano  
25  
26 existed in other sections of the country, notably New York City. Although  
27  
28 it was ostensibly a benevolent, fraternal society, the fact is that in Chicago  
29  
30 and in many other areas it provided a front for some Mafia activities. In  
31  
32 Chicago, the Unione Siciliano exerted considerable influence in the municipal  
33  
34 (71) (72)  
35 government because of the political patronage it bought and paid for. (62-23331-1;  
36  
37 62-75147-9-80, pp. 68, 69)

38 As gang leader, Capone was in a position to avoid direct  
39  
40 participation in criminal activities and in gang feuds. The St. Valentine's Day  
41  
42 massacre in 1929 of seven leaders of the rival "Bugs" Moran gang is an  
43  
44 illustration of how Capone dealt with the opposition and how he protected  
45  
46 himself. Capone had an airtight alibi--he was in Florida at the time. His  
47  
48 numerous vice, gambling, and liquor establishments were operated for him by  
49  
50 underlings. By the end of the 1920's, Capone was the undisputed "crime king"  
51  
52 (73)  
53 of Chicago.  
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8 The monopoly of the Capone gang over other phases of criminality

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10 was shown in the cleaning and dyeing industry in Chicago. Threats were made

11  
12 and acts of violence were committed by members and organizers of a retail

13  
14 cleaning and dyeing association against independent cleaners and dyers who

15  
16 refused to join. Several organizers were indicted for damage they had

17  
18 inflicted on independent cleaners, but they were acquitted in a trial.

19  
20 Intimidation and violence continued to plague the independents until one

21  
22 independent, in announcing that Capone had become a "partner" in his shop,

23  
24 (74)  
25 boasted publicly that he then had the "best protection in the world."

26  
27  
28 At the time of Capone's trial in 1931 for Federal income tax

29 -  
30 evasion, the United States attorney estimated that the gross annual income

31  
32 of the Capone gang totalled about 70 million dollars. The director of the

33  
34 Chicago Crime Commission once declared that the Capone gang was a

35  
36 criminal organization with a menacing power surpassing that of the Mafia

37  
38 (75)

39  
40 in Sicily.

41  
42 B. Mafia and "Good Killers" Gang

43  
44 In 1921, police in several big cities uncovered an early version

45  
46 of Murder, Inc., in the form of a Mafia gang which had been given the name

47  
48 "Good Killers." This group of assassins was suspected of some 125 unsolved

49  
50 murders of Italians in New York City, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Chicago.

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12 Persons in this Mafia operation had immigrated to the United States  
13 about 12 years before from the Castellammare area of Sicily. They became so  
14 noted for their talents that their services were widely sought and highly paid  
15 for. They specialized in the murder of individuals for any reason, but their  
16 activities also included the robbery of successful Italian merchants and the  
17 control of the Italian policy game.  
18  
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20  
21 One method utilized by the "Good Killers" was to force or hire  
22 other Italian gangsters to do the actual killings and then murder them as a cover  
23 up. The "Good Killers" gang was reported to have accumulated a "war chest"  
24 of \$200,000. Several leaders of that murder band established themselves  
25 in business in the Italian communities of cities in order to conceal the criminal  
26 manner in which they acquired their wealth. (76-81)  
27  
28

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30 C. Modernization of Mafia  
31  
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33  
34 Until after World War I, the Mafia in the United States was led by  
35 old-time Mafiosi who were extremely clannish and adamantly refused to  
36 associate with any but their own Sicilian-born countrymen. But a change was  
37 signified when Giuseppe Masseria declared himself the leader of the Mafia  
38 in New York City after Ignazio "Lupo the Wolf" Saletta was given a long  
39 prison term for counterfeiting. Masseria, who was nicknamed "Joe the Boss,"  
40 was as clannish as his predecessors, but he did permit his associates to form  
41 friendships and establish contacts with groups of different nationalities.  
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7 Masseria's chief lieutenant was a young Sicilian named Charles  
8  
9 "Lucky" Luciano. Luciano personified the Americanized faction of the  
10  
11 Italian criminal element and made it a point to become friendly and to make  
12  
13 alliances with outside Italian and non-Italian hoodlums. Among his friends  
14  
15 and contacts were Louis "Lepke" Buchalter, Jacob "Garrah" Shapiro,  
16  
17 Meyer Lansky, Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel, "Dandy" Phil Kastel, and  
18  
19 (83)  
20 Abner "Longie" Zwillman.  
21  
22

23 Luciano thoroughly endorsed the trend in crime toward cooperation  
24  
25 with other criminal groups and toward less intergang rivalry and indiscriminate  
26  
27 murder in the old Mafia manner. Luciano was given a free hand, which was  
28  
29 (84)  
30 to prove Masseria's undoing.  
31

32 Since Luciano was ambitious, it was inevitable that criminal nature  
33  
34 should take its course. Masseria came to a violent end in April, 1931, after  
35  
36 he had dined with Luciano in a Coney Island restaurant. Luciano was in the  
37  
38 men's room and conveniently absent from the table when several assassins  
39  
40 (85)  
41 walked in and shot Masseria to death.  
42

43 Despite Masseria's demise, there still remained a number of  
44  
45 old-line Maffiosi in position of leadership in Italian gangs, notably  
46  
47 Salvatore Marrazano. "Lepke" Buchalter, with whom Luciano was quite  
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9 intimate, is said to have convinced Luciano that the old-type Italian hoodlums  
10 stood in the way of progress and would have to be liquidated. Five months  
11 after Masseria met his death, Marrazano was shot and his throat cut in his  
12 office in a mid-Manhattan building. It is also reported that within a period of  
13 several days, some 20 or 40 other older leaders of Mafia groups throughout  
14 (86)  
15 the country were murdered.  
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22 With this mass bloodletting, many of the Mafia's old-fashioned  
23 leaders were eliminated, together with their antiquated methods. The new,  
24 younger, and Americanized Mafiosi were then in a position to cooperate  
25 and collaborate fully with outside criminal groups and to join together in  
26 (87)  
27 the construction of the new criminal order--the syndicate.  
28  
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33 Ever since Luciano established the precedent, Mafiosi have  
34 worked freely and closely with criminals and criminal groups of other  
35 nationality and racial backgrounds. Through traditional and effective  
36 Mafia methods of maintaining leadership and discipline, Mafiosi associated  
37 in criminal enterprises with non-Italians have been able to keep the  
38 (88)  
39 latter "in line."  
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47 Thus, Mafiosi, who had entered the Prohibition era involved  
48 in criminal activities within the limits of various Italian communities as  
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individuals or in small groups, found themselves at the end of Prohibition  
banding together on a wider scale for mutually beneficial criminal purposes,  
operating with hoodlums and criminal groups of other nationalities, and  
operating in areas outside the Italian communities.

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8 V. MAFIA SINCE END OF PROHIBITION  
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11 A. Gambling  
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13 Gambling feeds on the desire of human beings to take a chance and  
14 possibly win a great amount of money. With criminals more than eager to  
15 cater to such a human failing, gambling has always been a lush field of  
16 criminal endeavor.  
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21 With the end of Prohibition, the active gangs of the Mafiosi and other  
22 criminals involved in extensive bootlegging turned towards new spheres of "easy  
23 money." Gambling was made to order for them. In gambling--as in  
24 Prohibition--criminals offered what many people desired even though it was  
25 (89)  
26 illegal in many forms. They capitalized on human desires.  
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33 1. General  
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35 As has been stated, the Mafia does not constitute all of organized  
36 crime. Rather, it is a part of the whole, distinguishable by characteristics  
37 reminiscent of and generally the same as those of the Mafia in Italy. To trace  
38 each event and each step in the history of the Mafia in this country would be  
39 extremely difficult, if not impossible, since so much of its lethal, conspiratorial  
40 nature has been hidden from public view and even from law enforcement. There  
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